CVE-2024-52046 (GCVE-0-2024-52046)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2024-12-25 10:06 – Updated: 2025-08-02 03:55
VLAI?
Title
Apache MINA: MINA applications using unbounded deserialization may allow RCE
Summary
The ObjectSerializationDecoder in Apache MINA uses Java’s native deserialization protocol to process
incoming serialized data but lacks the necessary security checks and defenses. This vulnerability allows
attackers to exploit the deserialization process by sending specially crafted malicious serialized data,
potentially leading to remote code execution (RCE) attacks.
This issue affects MINA core versions 2.0.X, 2.1.X and 2.2.X, and will be fixed by the releases 2.0.27, 2.1.10 and 2.2.4.
It's also important to note that an application using MINA core library will only be affected if the IoBuffer#getObject() method is called, and this specific method is potentially called when adding a ProtocolCodecFilter instance using the ObjectSerializationCodecFactory class in the filter chain. If your application is specifically using those classes, you have to upgrade to the latest version of MINA core library.
Upgrading will not be enough: you also need to explicitly allow the classes the decoder will accept in the ObjectSerializationDecoder instance, using one of the three new methods:
/**
* Accept class names where the supplied ClassNameMatcher matches for
* deserialization, unless they are otherwise rejected.
*
* @param classNameMatcher the matcher to use
*/
public void accept(ClassNameMatcher classNameMatcher)
/**
* Accept class names that match the supplied pattern for
* deserialization, unless they are otherwise rejected.
*
* @param pattern standard Java regexp
*/
public void accept(Pattern pattern)
/**
* Accept the wildcard specified classes for deserialization,
* unless they are otherwise rejected.
*
* @param patterns Wildcard file name patterns as defined by
* {@link org.apache.commons.io.FilenameUtils#wildcardMatch(String, String) FilenameUtils.wildcardMatch}
*/
public void accept(String... patterns)
By default, the decoder will reject *all* classes that will be present in the incoming data.
Note: The FtpServer, SSHd and Vysper sub-project are not affected by this issue.
Severity ?
CWE
- CWE-502 - Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Assigner
References
| URL | Tags | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation | Apache MINA |
Unknown:
2.0 , ≤ 2.0.26
(semver)
Affected: 2.1 , ≤ 2.1.9 (semver) Affected: 2.2 , ≤ 2.2.3 (semver) |
Credits
The initial report was submitted by Bofei Chen, with all the necessary bits to reproduce the RCE
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If your application is specifically using those classes, you have to upgrade to the latest version of MINA core library.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nUpgrading will\\u00a0 not be enough: you also need to explicitly allow the classes the decoder will accept in the ObjectSerializationDecoder instance, using one of the three new methods:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n /**\\n\\n\\u00a0 \\u00a0\\u00a0 * Accept class names where the supplied ClassNameMatcher matches for\\n\\n * deserialization, unless they are otherwise rejected.\\n\\n *\\n\\n * @param classNameMatcher the matcher to use\\n\\n */\\n\\n public void accept(ClassNameMatcher classNameMatcher)\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n /**\\n\\n * Accept class names that match the supplied pattern for\\n\\n * deserialization, unless they are otherwise rejected.\\n\\n *\\n\\n * @param pattern standard Java regexp\\n\\n */\\n\\n public void accept(Pattern pattern) \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n /**\\n\\n * Accept the wildcard specified classes for deserialization,\\n\\n * unless they are otherwise rejected.\\n\\n *\\n\\n * @param patterns Wildcard file name patterns as defined by\\n\\n * {@link org.apache.commons.io.FilenameUtils#wildcardMatch(String, String) FilenameUtils.wildcardMatch}\\n\\n */\\n\\n public void accept(String... patterns)\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nBy default, the decoder will reject *all* classes that will be present in the incoming data.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nNote: The FtpServer, SSHd and Vysper sub-project are not affected by this issue.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cdiv\u003e\\n\\t\\t\\t\u003cdiv\u003e\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\u003cdiv\u003e\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t\u003cdiv\u003e\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t\\t\u003cp\u003eThe ObjectSerializationDecoder in Apache MINA uses Java\\u2019s native deserialization protocol to process\\nincoming serialized data but lacks the necessary security checks and defenses. 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If your application is specifically using those classes, you have to upgrade to the latest version of MINA core library.\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eUpgrading will\u0026nbsp; not be enough: you also need to explicitly allow the classes the decoder will accept in the \u003cspan style=\\\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\\\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\\\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\\\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\\\"background-color: rgb(212, 212, 212);\\\"\u003eObjectSerializationDecoder\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e instance, using one of the three new methods:\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cp\u003e /**\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp; * Accept class names where the supplied ClassNameMatcher matches for\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e * deserialization, unless they are otherwise rejected.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e *\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e * @param classNameMatcher the matcher to use\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e */\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e public void \u003cspan style=\\\"background-color: rgb(212, 212, 212);\\\"\u003eaccept\u003c/span\u003e(ClassNameMatcher classNameMatcher)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e /**\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e * Accept class names that match the supplied pattern for\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e * deserialization, unless they are otherwise rejected.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e *\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e * @param pattern standard Java regexp\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e */\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e public void accept(Pattern pattern) \u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e /**\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e * Accept the wildcard specified classes for deserialization,\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e * unless they are otherwise rejected.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e *\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e * @param patterns Wildcard file name patterns as defined by\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e * {@link org.apache.commons.io.FilenameUtils#wildcardMatch(String, String) FilenameUtils.wildcardMatch}\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e */\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e public void accept(String... patterns)\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eBy default, the decoder will reject *all* classes that will be present in the incoming data.\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eNote: The FtpServer, SSHd and Vysper sub-project are not affected by this issue.\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-502\", \"description\": \"CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data\"}]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09\", \"shortName\": \"apache\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2025-02-12T09:33:36.380Z\"}}}",
"cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2024-52046\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2025-08-02T03:55:42.727Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2024-11-05T13:13:06.944Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09\", \"datePublished\": \"2024-12-25T10:06:23.887Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"apache\"}",
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.1"
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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