FKIE_CVE-2024-58009

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-02-27 03:15 - Updated: 2025-11-03 20:16
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: handle NULL sock pointer in l2cap_sock_alloc A NULL sock pointer is passed into l2cap_sock_alloc() when it is called from l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() and the error handling paths should also be aware of it. Seemingly a more elegant solution would be to swap bt_sock_alloc() and l2cap_chan_create() calls since they are not interdependent to that moment but then l2cap_chan_create() adds the soon to be deallocated and still dummy-initialized channel to the global list accessible by many L2CAP paths. The channel would be removed from the list in short period of time but be a bit more straight-forward here and just check for NULL instead of changing the order of function calls. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE static analysis tool.

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  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: L2CAP: handle NULL sock pointer in l2cap_sock_alloc\n\nA NULL sock pointer is passed into l2cap_sock_alloc() when it is called\nfrom l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() and the error handling paths should\nalso be aware of it.\n\nSeemingly a more elegant solution would be to swap bt_sock_alloc() and\nl2cap_chan_create() calls since they are not interdependent to that moment\nbut then l2cap_chan_create() adds the soon to be deallocated and still\ndummy-initialized channel to the global list accessible by many L2CAP\npaths. The channel would be removed from the list in short period of time\nbut be a bit more straight-forward here and just check for NULL instead of\nchanging the order of function calls.\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE static\nanalysis tool."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: Bluetooth: L2CAP: gestionar puntero sock NULL en l2cap_sock_alloc Se pasa un puntero sock NULL a l2cap_sock_alloc() cuando se llama desde l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() y las rutas de gesti\u00f3n de errores tambi\u00e9n deber\u00edan tenerlo en cuenta. Aparentemente, una soluci\u00f3n m\u00e1s elegante ser\u00eda intercambiar las llamadas bt_sock_alloc() y l2cap_chan_create() ya que no son interdependientes en ese momento, pero luego l2cap_chan_create() agrega el canal que pronto se desasignar\u00e1 y a\u00fan tiene inicializaci\u00f3n ficticia a la lista global accesible por muchas rutas L2CAP. El canal se eliminar\u00eda de la lista en un corto per\u00edodo de tiempo, pero aqu\u00ed ser\u00eda un poco m\u00e1s directo y solo verificar\u00eda si es NULL en lugar de cambiar el orden de las llamadas de funci\u00f3n. Encontrado por Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) con la herramienta de an\u00e1lisis est\u00e1tico SVACE."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2024-58009",
  "lastModified": "2025-11-03T20:16:57.950",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
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        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 5.5,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
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        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
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  "published": "2025-02-27T03:15:11.880",
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  "vulnStatus": "Modified",
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          "value": "CWE-476"
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}


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