{
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:openclaw:openclaw:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "0F3079A3-9FBD-4E87-821D-5CAF0622C555",
              "versionEndExcluding": "2026.2.14",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Discovery beacons (Bonjour/mDNS and DNS-SD) include TXT records such as `lanHost`, `tailnetDns`, `gatewayPort`, and `gatewayTlsSha256`. TXT records are unauthenticated. Prior to version 2026.2.14, some clients treated TXT values as authoritative routing/pinning inputs. iOS and macOS used TXT-provided host hints (`lanHost`/`tailnetDns`) and ports (`gatewayPort`) to build the connection URL. iOS and Android allowed the discovery-provided TLS fingerprint (`gatewayTlsSha256`) to override a previously stored TLS pin. On a shared/untrusted LAN, an attacker could advertise a rogue `_openclaw-gw._tcp` service. This could cause a client to connect to an attacker-controlled endpoint and/or accept an attacker certificate, potentially exfiltrating Gateway credentials (`auth.token` / `auth.password`) during connection. As of time of publication, the iOS and Android apps are alpha/not broadly shipped (no public App Store / Play Store release). Practical impact is primarily limited to developers/testers running those builds, plus any other shipped clients relying on discovery on a shared/untrusted LAN. Version 2026.2.14 fixes the issue. Clients now prefer the resolved service endpoint (SRV + A/AAAA) over TXT-provided routing hints. Discovery-provided fingerprints no longer override stored TLS pins. In iOS/Android, first-time TLS pins require explicit user confirmation (fingerprint shown; no silent TOFU) and discovery-based direct connects are TLS-only. In Android, hostname verification is no longer globally disabled (only bypassed when pinning)."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "OpenClaw es un asistente personal de IA. Las balizas de descubrimiento (Bonjour/mDNS y DNS-SD) incluyen registros TXT como \u0027lanHost\u0027, \u0027tailnetDns\u0027, \u0027gatewayPort\u0027 y \u0027gatewayTlsSha256\u0027. Los registros TXT no est\u00e1n autenticados. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 2026.2.14, algunos clientes trataban los valores TXT como entradas autoritativas de enrutamiento/fijaci\u00f3n. iOS y macOS usaban las sugerencias de host (\u0027lanHost\u0027/\u0027tailnetDns\u0027) y los puertos (\u0027gatewayPort\u0027) proporcionados por TXT para construir la URL de conexi\u00f3n. iOS y Android permit\u00edan que la huella digital TLS (\u0027gatewayTlsSha256\u0027) proporcionada por el descubrimiento anulara una fijaci\u00f3n TLS previamente almacenada. En una LAN compartida/no confiable, un atacante podr\u00eda anunciar un servicio \u0027_openclaw-gw._tcp\u0027 malicioso. Esto podr\u00eda hacer que un cliente se conectara a un punto final controlado por un atacante y/o aceptara un certificado de atacante, potencialmente exfiltrando credenciales de Gateway (\u0027auth.token\u0027 / \u0027auth.password\u0027) durante la conexi\u00f3n. En el momento de la publicaci\u00f3n, las aplicaciones de iOS y Android est\u00e1n en fase alfa/no se han distribuido ampliamente (sin lanzamiento p\u00fablico en App Store / Play Store). El impacto pr\u00e1ctico se limita principalmente a desarrolladores/probadores que ejecutan esas compilaciones, adem\u00e1s de cualquier otro cliente distribuido que dependa del descubrimiento en una LAN compartida/no confiable. La versi\u00f3n 2026.2.14 corrige el problema. Los clientes ahora prefieren el punto final de servicio resuelto (SRV + A/AAAA) sobre las sugerencias de enrutamiento proporcionadas por TXT. Las huellas digitales proporcionadas por el descubrimiento ya no anulan las fijaciones TLS almacenadas. En iOS/Android, las fijaciones TLS por primera vez requieren confirmaci\u00f3n expl\u00edcita del usuario (huella digital mostrada; sin TOFU silencioso) y las conexiones directas basadas en descubrimiento son solo TLS. En Android, la verificaci\u00f3n de nombre de host ya no est\u00e1 deshabilitada globalmente (solo se omite al fijar)."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-26327",
  "lastModified": "2026-02-23T13:44:36.753",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 6.5,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "NONE",
          "attackVector": "ADJACENT",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 7.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-02-19T23:16:26.100",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/d583782ee322a6faa1fe87ae52455e0d349de586"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Product",
        "Release Notes"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.14"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Patch",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-pv58-549p-qh99"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-345"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}