GHSA-879P-475X-RQH2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-24 20:37 – Updated: 2026-02-24 20:37commit: e0f8d9b2047af417d8faf354b675941f3dac9891 (as-of 2026-02-04) channel: GitHub security advisory (per SECURITY.md)
summary
The local caddy admin API (default listen 127.0.0.1:2019) exposes a state-changing POST /load endpoint that replaces the entire running configuration.
When origin enforcement is not enabled (enforce_origin not configured), the admin endpoint accepts cross-origin requests (e.g., from attacker-controlled web content in a victim browser) and applies an attacker-supplied JSON config. this can change the admin listener settings and alter HTTP server behavior without user intent.
Severity
Medium
Justification: - The attacker can apply an arbitrary caddy config (integrity impact) by driving a victim’s local admin API. - Exploitation requires a victim running caddy with the admin API enabled and visiting an attacker-controlled page (or otherwise issuing the request from an untrusted local client).
Affected component
caddyconfig/load.go: adminLoad.handleLoad(/loadadmin endpoint)- Pinned callsite: https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/blob/e0f8d9b2047af417d8faf354b675941f3dac9891/caddyconfig/load.go#L73
Reproduction
Attachment: poc.zip (integration harness) with canonical and control runs.
unzip -q -o poc.zip -d poc
cd poc/poc-F-CADDY-ADMIN-LOAD-001
make test
Expected output (excerpt):
[CALLSITE_HIT]: adminLoad.handleLoad
[PROOF_MARKER]: http_code=200 admin_moved=true response_pwned=true
Control output (excerpt):
[NC_MARKER]: http_code=403 load_blocked=true admin_moved=false response_pwned=false
Impact
An attacker can replace the running caddy configuration via the local admin API. Depending on the deployed configuration/modules, this can: - Change admin listener settings (e.g., move the admin listener to a new address) - Change HTTP server behavior (e.g., alter routes/responses)
Suggested remediation
Ensure cross-origin web content cannot trigger POST /load on the local admin API by default, for example by:
- Enabling origin enforcement by default for unsafe methods, and/or
- Requiring an unguessable token for /load (and other state-changing admin endpoints).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.11.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27589"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-24T20:37:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-24T17:29:04Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "commit: e0f8d9b2047af417d8faf354b675941f3dac9891 (as-of 2026-02-04)\nchannel: GitHub security advisory (per SECURITY.md)\n\n## summary\n\nThe local caddy admin API (default listen `127.0.0.1:2019`) exposes a state-changing `POST /load` endpoint that replaces the entire running configuration.\n\nWhen origin enforcement is not enabled (`enforce_origin` not configured), the admin endpoint accepts cross-origin requests (e.g., from attacker-controlled web content in a victim browser) and applies an attacker-supplied JSON config. this can change the admin listener settings and alter HTTP server behavior without user intent.\n\n## Severity\n\nMedium\n\nJustification:\n- The attacker can apply an arbitrary caddy config (integrity impact) by driving a victim\u2019s local admin API.\n- Exploitation requires a victim running caddy with the admin API enabled and visiting an attacker-controlled page (or otherwise issuing the request from an untrusted local client).\n\n## Affected component\n\n- `caddyconfig/load.go: adminLoad.handleLoad` (`/load` admin endpoint)\n- Pinned callsite: https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/blob/e0f8d9b2047af417d8faf354b675941f3dac9891/caddyconfig/load.go#L73\n\n## Reproduction\n\nAttachment: `poc.zip` (integration harness) with canonical and control runs.\n\n```bash\nunzip -q -o poc.zip -d poc\ncd poc/poc-F-CADDY-ADMIN-LOAD-001\nmake test\n```\n\nExpected output (excerpt):\n\n```\n[CALLSITE_HIT]: adminLoad.handleLoad\n[PROOF_MARKER]: http_code=200 admin_moved=true response_pwned=true\n```\n\nControl output (excerpt):\n\n```\n[NC_MARKER]: http_code=403 load_blocked=true admin_moved=false response_pwned=false\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can replace the running caddy configuration via the local admin API. Depending on the deployed configuration/modules, this can:\n- Change admin listener settings (e.g., move the admin listener to a new address)\n- Change HTTP server behavior (e.g., alter routes/responses)\n\n## Suggested remediation\n\nEnsure cross-origin web content cannot trigger `POST /load` on the local admin API by default, for example by:\n- Enabling origin enforcement by default for unsafe methods, and/or\n- Requiring an unguessable token for `/load` (and other state-changing admin endpoints).\n\n[poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25079818/poc.zip)\n[PR_DESCRIPTION.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25079820/PR_DESCRIPTION.md)",
"id": "GHSA-879p-475x-rqh2",
"modified": "2026-02-24T20:37:35Z",
"published": "2026-02-24T20:37:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/security/advisories/GHSA-879p-475x-rqh2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27589"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/commit/65e0ddc22137bbbaa68c842ae0b98d0548504545"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/releases/tag/v2.11.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Caddy is vulnerable to cross-origin config application via local admin API /load "
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.