hsec-2023-0009
Vulnerability from osv_haskell
Published
2025-11-14 14:45
Modified
2025-11-14 14:45
Summary
git-annex command injection via malicious SSH hostname
Details

git-annex command injection via malicious SSH hostname

git-annex was vulnerable to the same class of security hole as git's CVE-2017-1000117. In several cases, git-annex parses a repository URL, and uses it to generate a ssh command, with the hostname to ssh to coming from the URL. If the hostname it parses is something like -eProxyCommand=evil, this could result in arbitrary local code execution.

Some details of URL parsing may prevent the exploit working in some cases.

Exploiting this would involve the attacker tricking the victim into adding a remote something like ssh://-eProxyCommand=evil/blah.

One possible avenue for an attacker that avoids exposing the URL to the user is to use initremote with an SSH remote, so embedding the URL in the git-annex branch. Then the victim would enable it with enableremote.

This was fixed in version 6.20170818. Now there's a SshHost type that is not allowed to start with a dash, and every invocation of git-annex uses a function that takes a SshHost.

To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "human_link": "https://github.com/haskell/security-advisories/tree/main/advisories/published/2023/HSEC-2023-0009.md",
        "osv": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/haskell/security-advisories/refs/heads/generated/osv-export/2023/HSEC-2023-0009.json"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Hackage",
        "name": "git-annex"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.20170818"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-12976"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "home": "https://github.com/haskell/security-advisories",
    "osvs": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/haskell/security-advisories/refs/heads/generated/osv-export",
    "repository": "https://github.com/haskell/security-advisories"
  },
  "details": "# *git-annex* command injection via malicious SSH hostname\n\n*git-annex* was vulnerable to the same class of security hole as\ngit\u0027s **CVE-2017-1000117**. In several cases, `git-annex` parses a\nrepository URL, and uses it to generate a `ssh` command, with the\nhostname to ssh to coming from the URL. If the hostname it parses is\nsomething like `-eProxyCommand=evil`, this could result in arbitrary\nlocal code execution.\n\nSome details of URL parsing may prevent the exploit working in some\ncases.\n\nExploiting this would involve the attacker tricking the victim into\nadding a remote something like `ssh://-eProxyCommand=evil/blah`.\n\nOne possible avenue for an attacker that avoids exposing the URL to\nthe user is to use `initremote` with an SSH remote, so embedding the\nURL in the *git-annex* branch. Then the victim would enable it with\n`enableremote`.\n\nThis was fixed in version **6.20170818**. Now there\u0027s a `SshHost`\ntype that is not allowed to start with a dash, and every invocation\nof `git-annex` uses a function that takes a `SshHost`.\n",
  "id": "HSEC-2023-0009",
  "modified": "2025-11-14T14:45:34Z",
  "published": "2025-11-14T14:45:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://git-annex.branchable.com/security/CVE-2017-12976/"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "http://source.git-annex.branchable.com/?p=source.git;a=commitdiff;h=df11e54788b254efebb4898b474de11ae8d3b471"
    }
  ],
  "related": [
    "CVE-2017-9800",
    "CVE-2017-12836",
    "CVE-2017-1000116",
    "CVE-2017-1000117"
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.5.0",
  "summary": "git-annex command injection via malicious SSH hostname"
}


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