mal-2026-949
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
Published
2026-02-19 23:39
Modified
2026-02-20 00:22
Summary
Malicious code in ethrpc-keys (PyPI)
Details

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: kam193 (f086c363123d21b52dc28b5a642db6c1eb84e01dc519995435476b19655d63a9)

The malicious code is in the ethrpc-keys package, which is a clone of legitimate eth-keys, but contains a modification that silently exfiltrates the user's private key. Other packages in the campaign are also clones of legitimate packages, but the only modification is in pulling (directly or traversally) the malicious dependency. At the end, all packages in the campaign exfiltrate the private key.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-02-old-ethrpc-keys

Reasons (based on the campaign):

  • clones-real-package

  • exfiltration-crypto

  • crypto-related

  • action-hidden-in-lib-usage

  • The malicious code is intentionally included in a dependency of the package

Credits
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) github.com/kam193 bad-packages.kam193.eu/
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "ethrpc-keys"
      },
      "versions": [
        "0.4.1",
        "0.4.3",
        "0.4.5",
        "0.4.6",
        "0.4.7",
        "0.4.8",
        "0.4.9",
        "0.5.0",
        "0.5.1",
        "0.5.2",
        "0.5.3",
        "0.5.4",
        "0.5.5",
        "0.5.6",
        "0.5.7"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [
    {
      "contact": [
        "https://github.com/kam193",
        "https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"
      ],
      "name": "Kamil Ma\u0144kowski (kam193)",
      "type": "REPORTER"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "iocs": {
      "domains": [
        "sign-tx.web3rpc.workers.dev"
      ],
      "urls": [
        "https://sign-tx.web3rpc.workers.dev/index.php?dpr="
      ]
    },
    "malicious-packages-origins": [
      {
        "id": "pypi/2026-02-old-ethrpc-keys/ethrpc-keys",
        "import_time": "2026-02-20T00:33:04.492873484Z",
        "modified_time": "2026-02-20T00:22:44.226541Z",
        "sha256": "f086c363123d21b52dc28b5a642db6c1eb84e01dc519995435476b19655d63a9",
        "source": "kam193",
        "versions": [
          "0.4.1",
          "0.4.3",
          "0.4.5",
          "0.4.6",
          "0.4.7",
          "0.4.8",
          "0.4.9",
          "0.5.0",
          "0.5.1",
          "0.5.2",
          "0.5.3",
          "0.5.4",
          "0.5.5",
          "0.5.6",
          "0.5.7"
        ]
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: kam193 (f086c363123d21b52dc28b5a642db6c1eb84e01dc519995435476b19655d63a9)\nThe malicious code is in the ethrpc-keys package, which is a clone of legitimate eth-keys, but contains a modification that silently exfiltrates the user\u0027s private key. Other packages in the campaign are also clones of legitimate packages, but the only modification is in pulling (directly or traversally) the malicious dependency. At the end, all packages in the campaign exfiltrate the private key.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-02-old-ethrpc-keys\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - clones-real-package\n\n\n - exfiltration-crypto\n\n\n - crypto-related\n\n\n - action-hidden-in-lib-usage\n\n\n - The malicious code is intentionally included in a dependency of the package\n",
  "id": "MAL-2026-949",
  "modified": "2026-02-20T00:22:44Z",
  "published": "2026-02-19T23:39:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/ethrpc-keys"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "Malicious code in ethrpc-keys (PyPI)"
}


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